Shapley value for constant-sum games

It is proved that Youngs [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symmetry is still valid for the Shapley value defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of grand coalition and on the entire class of constant-sum games as well.The research was supported by NWO (The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) grant NL-RF 047-008-010.I am thankful to Theo Driessen, Natalia Naumova and Elena Yanovskaya for interesting discussions and comments. The useful remarks of two anonymous referees are also appreciated.     

Additive stable solutions on perfect cones of cooperative games

Closed kernel systems of the coalition matrix turn out to correspond to cones of games on which the core correspondence is additive and on which the related barycentric solution is additive, stable and continuous. Different perfect cones corresponding to closed kernel systems are described. Received: December 2001/Revised: July 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  This note contains the new results, which were presented by the first author in an invited lecture at the XIV Italian Meeting on Game Theory and Applications in Ischia, July 2001. The lecture was dedicated to Irinel Dragan on the occasion of his seventieth birthday.     

On existence of undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games: a generalization

In this paper, we generalize the exitence result for pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games. By working directly on integrals of pure strategies, we also generalize, for the same class of games, the existence result for undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria even though, in general, the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria may fail to be weakly compact. Received August 2001     

The minority game with incomplete strategies

This paper proposes a new model of Incomplete Minority Game (IMG), which features a default hierarchy of rules. This model introduces random bits into players’ individual strategies and is capable of applying the exception rules in the absence of the default one. Analysis of the numerical experiment results indicates that, in comparison with the standard Minority Game (SMG) model, this IMG model expands the maximum ensemble of uncorrelated strategies (MEUS) and excels in the effective strategy set and dynamic evolution of individual strategies, which enhance the overall performance by reaching an approximate ideal status in a shorter time with less memory steps and more stable combination of strategies. This paper also discusses the practical implication of the new IMG model.     

关于拓扑对策中的I~2(K)I(K)问题

证明了如果空间类κ为D-空间类或闭遗传不可约空间类,则I(κ)(∈)κ.这一结果对于κ为D空间类和闭遗传不可约空间类,肯定地回答了I(κ)是否包含I2(κ)问题.     

Robust Optimal Stopping-Time Control for Nonlinear Systems

Abstract. We formulate a robust optimal stopping-time problem for a state-space system and give the connection between various notions of lower value function for the associated games (and storage function for the associated dissipative system) with solutions of the appropriate variational inequality (VI) (the analogue of the Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman—Isaacs equation for this setting). We show that the stopping-time rule can be obtained by solving the VI in the viscosity sense and a positive definite supersolution of the VI can be used for stability analysis.     

Sequencing games with repeated players

Two classes of one machine sequencing situations are considered in which each job corresponds to exactly one player but a player may have more than one job to be processed, so called RP(repeated player) sequencing situations. In max-RP sequencing situations it is assumed that each player’s cost function is linear with respect to the maximum completion time of his jobs, whereas in min-RP sequencing situations the cost functions are linear with respect to the minimum completion times. For both classes, following explicit procedures to go from the initial processing order to an optimal order for the coalition of all players, equal gain splitting rules are defined. It is shown that these rules lead to core elements of the associated RP sequencing games. Moreover, it is seen that min-RP sequencing games are convex. We thank two referees for their valuable suggestions for improvement. Financial support for P. Calleja has been given by the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER under grant SEJ2005-02443/ECON, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through a BE grant from AGAUR and grant 2005SGR00984.     

On the Sociobiology of Hawks and Doves. A phase diagram for integration and segregation

Competing groups in a population will be integrated or segregated depending on their contest strategies. In this work a population of a fixed proportion of hawks and doves is supposed to be able to employ two different contest strategies, one more competitive than the other one. Energies are derived for populations employing these strategies and these energies depend on the availability of the resource for which hawks and doves compete. The energy for the less competitive strategy is lower than the other one when the resource is abundant. In that case hawks and doves can be in cohabitation in all proportions. If, however, the resource is scarce, the energy of the more competitive strategy is lower than the other one. In that case complete segregation of hawks and doves into colonies will result. The situation is akin to the phase pressure diagram of a binary solution with eutectic point, miscibility gap in the liquid phase and complete miscibility in the vapour phase. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.